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BOOK REVIEW
By Edmond Cahn.t Indiana University Press,
Bloomington, Ind., New Midland Book Edition, 1981. Pp. 342. Reviewed by Harold D. Cunningham, Jr.t
THE MORAL DECISION.

The Moral Decision has been reviewed on many occasions since
itsfirstpublicationin 1955. In this current review, aformer student of Professor Cahn has reflected and drawn upon his personal knowledge of Professor Cahn to offer the reader a new
perspective of both the book and its author.
The Moral Decision' is an engaging book written more for the literate laymen than for the legal professional. Professor Cahn aims at
offering the reader a distillation of moral insights discerned from an
analysis of "cases"-actual controversies that have received the attention of courts of law. Cases, in his view, are "prisms" revealing "an
entire spectrum of moral forces-personal ambitions, group standards,
lusts, sufferings, and ideals." 2
The book is organized into three parts, each of which is further
subdivided by chapters and sections. Part One, "The Legal and the
Good," examines the relationship between law and morals and suggests how the law can provide moral guides and insights.' Part Two,
"Moral Guides in the American Law of Rights," demonstrates this thesis through illustrative cases touching on the moral content of substantive rules,4 while Part Three, "Moral Guides in the American Law of
Procedure," pursues the same theme from the viewpoint of procedural
norms.' Beginning with Part Two, Professor Calm provides notes that
t B.A., Tulane University, 1925; J.D., Tulane University School of Law, 1927. Pro-

fessor Cahn practiced law in New York City for over 20 years, and then devoted
the remainder of his life to full time teaching as a Professor at the New York
University School of Law until his death in 1964. His publications include: CONFRONTING INJUSTICE (1969) (published posthumously); THE PREDICAMENT OF
DEMOCRATIC MAN (1961); THE MORAL DECISION (1955); and THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE

(1949).

t B.A., Manhattan College, 1941; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1948; L.L.M.,
New York University School of Law, 1949; B.C.L., Oxford University, 1953; Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.
Rarely does one have an opportunity to review a book by one's former
teacher. Such, however, is my pleasure with this review. This circumstance
makes it possible to do more in these pages than to simply review a book. It offers
an occasion to evaluate the thinking of a scholar and teacher, to savor his style,
and to bring to the reader's attention insights that he shared with a student over 35
years ago, when I attended his graduate course in Jurisprudence at New York
University School of Law during the academic year 1948-1949.
1. E. CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION (1955) [hereinafter cited as THE MORAL
DECISION].

2. Id. at
3. Id at
4. Id at
5. Id at

4.
7-58.
59-248.
249-315.
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appear at the end of the book,6 as well as a short bibliography,7 to
provide further references for the reader. And, to enable the reader
better to follow the graceful but subtle flow of the author's theme, the
book includes a topical analysis.8
In Part One, Professor Cahn examines the relationship between
law and morals under two topic headings, "Morals as a Legal Order"
and "Law as a Moral Order." These topics complement one another,
for moral precepts can make the law meaningful and, correspondingly,
the law can give force to moral precepts. Professor Cahn frequently
alludes to the reciprocal contributions that law and morals make to one
another.'
To explain Professor Cahn's treatment of these ideas and to understand the various influences that have shaped his thinking, it is necessary to place him in perspective as a jurist. While Professor Cahn
refers frequently to famous jurists 0 and offers comments on the various
schools of legal philosophy," he does not specifically identify himself
with any particular jurisprudential viewpoint. For this reason, it is difficult to discern the dominant influences on his thinking. One point,
however, is clear: Professor Cahn demands a moral element in law, and
he moves effortlessly between the familiar realms of law and ethics. In
so doing, he is following the example of many of his predecessors. Jurists in the natural law tradition 2 from Aristotle 3 to Saint Thomas
6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

11.
12.
13.

Id at 321-29.
Id. at 319.
Id at 334-42.
Eg., "It is realistic to look at the law . ..as a rich repository of moral knowledge .. ." Id at 3; "Where the legal doctrine so conspicuously overlaps with
what we are used to call [sic] morals, it should have momentous lessons to teach
us." Id at 38.
Eg., Aristotle, id at 5, 10, 73, 136-37, 299; Immanuel Kant, id at 18, 86; Jeremy
Bentham, id at 22-23, 157, 297; Thomas Hobbes, id.at 193; Jean Jacques Rousseau, id.at 35; Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, id.at 65, 75-77, 144-45, 181, 287;
Judge Jerome Frank, id.at 257-58, 304; John Chipman Gray, id at 302, 308; Max
Weber, id at 275.
E.g., higher law theories of the ancient world, id.at 5, 24; utilitarianism, id.at 13;
positivism, id at 36; pragmatism (realism), id.at 47, 156, 295.
For a succinct account of the natural law, or law of nature school of jurisprudence, see E. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE, MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 332-75
(1953).
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), in his celebrated work, The Nichomachean Ethics, wrote
of the moral content of law:
[T]he law bids us do both the acts of a brave man (e.g. not to desert our
post nor take to flight nor throw away our arms), and those of a temperate man (e.g. not to commit adultery nor to gratify one's lust), and those
of a good-tempered man (e.g. not to strike another nor to speak evil),
and similarly with regard to the other virtues and forms of wickedness,
commanding some acts and forbidding others; and the rightly-framed
law does this rightly, and the hastily conceived one less well.
ARISTOTLE, THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, book V (W. Ross trans. 1925), reprinted
in G.
LAW

CHRISTIE, JURISPRUDENCE, TEXT AND READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF

58 (1973) [hereinafter cited as G.

CHRISTIE].
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Aquinas,' 4 and more recently to Dr. John Finnis,"5 have insisted that
law does, and should, reflect moral values, and indeed, that one of the
criteria for the validity of a legal norm must be its congruence with
moral sentiments. In contrast, proponents of the positivist tradition in
legal philosophy 6 deny a necessary connection between law and morality,17 while jurists of the realist persuasion assert that concern over
the relationship between law and morals may be misplaced. 8 The inquiry, the realists feel, should focus on the practice of the courts--on
what judges and other officials do-not on what should be included in,
or excluded from, a definition of law or a rule formulation.' 9
14. Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), in his monumental work Summa Theologica,
stated:
[Elvery law aims at being obeyed by those who are subject to it. Consetquently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to
their proper virtue: and since virtue is that which makes its subject good,
it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is
given, good, either simply or in some particular respect.
T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA question 92, art. I (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans. 1915), reprinted in G. CHRISTIE, supra note 13, at 100
(emphasis in original).
15. Dr. John Finnis, Fellow of University College, Oxford, and a major contemporary exponent of natural law, wrote:
[T]he principles of natural law . . .are traced out not only in moral
philosophy or ethics and 'individual' conduct, but also in political philosophy and jurisprudence, in political action, adjudication, and the life
of the citizen. For those principles justify the exercise of authority in
community. They require, too, that the authority be exercised, in most
circumstances, according to the manner conveniently labelled the Rule
of Law, and with due respect for the human rights which embody the
requirements of justice, and for the purpose of promoting a common
good in which such respect for rights is a component.
J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23 (1980).

16. See G. PATON& D. DERHAM, A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 5-14 (4th ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as G. PATON]; E. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 82-88.
The adjectives "imperative" or "analytical" are also used to describe the positivist
school.
17. John Austin (1790-1859), in his first lecture on jurisprudence, entitled The Province ofJurisprudenceDetermined, carefully distinguished law in the strict sense of
the term from morals. The former is a norm posited by a political superior for the
direction of subordinates, the breach of which entails the imposition of a punitive
sanction. The latter cannot properly be described as law for it lacks a sanction

and rests ultimately on convention. J.

AUSTIN,

1 LECTURES

ON JURISPRUDENCE

(5th ed. 1885), reprintedin G. CHRISTIE, supra note 13, at 471-83. Other jurists
who sharply distinguish law from morals and who deny the preeminence of moral
norms include Hans Kelsen, whose Pure Theory ofLaw isdiscussed in E. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 259-65. For a further discussion of Kelsen's views, see G.
CHRISTIE, supra note 13, at 631-34; H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 35-36 (1961);
G. PATON, supra note 16, at 113-14. The relationship between law and morals
continues to generate a lively controversy in legal literature. See L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (1964); Fuller, The Morality of Law, 10 VILL. L. REV. 623,
623-78 (1965); Hart, Positivism andthe Separationof Law andMorals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
18. For an account of the realist position, see E. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 507-08.
19. Karl Llewellyn, for example, stated: "The 'rules' are laid down; in the type case
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There are several other schools of legal philosophy, 20 each claiming to have the key to a proper understanding of the meaning of law,
and answers to the salient questions of jurisprudence.2 1 Professor
Cahn, however, in his search for an understanding of the relationship
between law and morals, eschewed identity with any particular school.
Early in his career, he formed an attitude of cautious incredulity towards speculation aimed at deducing a litany of structured precepts
from a priori postulates.2 2 In The Moral Decision, this suspicion of
preconceived value systems became an underlying premise to his thinking. Thus, while Professor Calm shared with the positivists a reluctance to give an authoritative system of morals preeminence over law,
he distrusted the positivists' notion that "the law is only the established
and existing list of official commands; and speculation on what the
rules of law ought to be constitutes a waste of effort." 23 Professor Cahn
may have been more comfortable with the realist viewpoint, but not in
the cynical sense of Justice Holmes. 24 Rather, he would share the ap-

20.

21.

22.
23.

24.

they are 'ought' rules, prescriptive rules: the writer's prescriptions, the writer's
oughts, individually proclaimed oughts-the true rule is that judges should give
judgment for the plaintiff on these facts." Llewellyn, 4 Realistic JurisprudenceThe Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 443 (1930). Llewellyn later stated it more
simply: "What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself." K.
LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1960).
Eg., the idealist (Immanuel Kant), see E. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 376-89;
the historical (Friedrich von Savigny, Sir Henry Maine, James Carter), see id at
404-25; the utilitarian (Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Rudolph von Jhering),
see id at 439-64; the sociological (Roscoe Pound, Eugen Ehrlich), see id. at 79-81,
509-27.
Patterson formulated these questions as follows: "What is law?" ""hat is the
law?" "What should be the law?" E. PATTERSON, supra note 12, at 4-5 (emphasis
in original). In the first lecture of my jurisprudence class on September 27, 1948,
Professor Cahn asked his students to imagine a pitch black field around the perimeter of which were a series of search lights. Each light represented a school of
jurisprudence. A person behind each light saw only the field as illuminated by his
light. Consequently, the answers to these salient questions of jurisprudence can
only be discovered by lighting every light and examining the teaching of every
school, and even then, there will always be room for more lights.
E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 190 (1949) [hereinafter cited as THE SENSE OF
INJUSTICE]. Professor Cahn had little sympathy for "a list of natural and immutable moral precepts." THE MORAL DECISION 25.
THE MORAL DECISION 36-37. Professor Cahn objected to an elite priestly caste,
for example, stating: "And-most important in this development-the very same
priestly group that regularly dispensed the mysteries and performed the ritual, by
like authority and with like finality announced what kind of conduct was or was
not to be considered good." Id at 21.
Illustrative of Justice Holmes' cynicism is his famous statement that "the prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I
mean by law." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
In United Zinc & Chem. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922), Justice Holmes restricted
the application of the attractive nuisance doctrine, and denied recovery for burns
from sulfuric acid resulting in the death of two boys who thought a brick cellar
containing an attractive pool of water, but which actually contained sulfuric acid,
was a fine place in which to swim. See THE MORAL DECISION 74-75. Professor
Cahn regretted Justice Holmes' myopic holding in this case. Id
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proach to realism of his close friend, Judge Jerome Frank.2 5 Another
noted jurist, for whose view Professor Cahn may have had considerable
empathy, is John Stuart Mill. Mill thought justice could best be defined in terms of its opposites.26 Professor Calm adopted a similar approach in another of his books, The Sense of Injustice.27 There, he
sought to reach an understanding of justice by focusing on instances of
injustice. 28 Also like Mill, Professor Cahn recognized the importance
of instinct in forming human values, 29 and, again like Mill, he gave
preeminence to liberty as a legally protected interest.3 °
As for the relationship between law and morals, Professor Cahn's
position is unique. He wrote The Moral Decision before publication of
the celebrated Wolfenden Report, 3 1 which recommended decriminalizing certain acts of sexual immorality, and before the controversy generated by this report between Lord Justice Devlin, who believed that the
25. Professor Cahn wrote:
Those of us who were introduced to the law in the conceptualistic murk
of the 1920s are bound to remember with gratitude the brave company
of so-called 'realists' who forced the windows open and gave us light and
air. Foremost of that band, Jerome Frank continues-with zest and
sparkle--to disturb the complacent, to shock the intellectual prudes, and
to lay a youthfully tempestuous siege to the heart of justice.
Calm, Book Review, 59 YALE L.J. 809, 811-12 (1959) (reviewing J. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949)); see J.
FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930), reprintedin G. CHRISTIE, supra
note 13, at 697-709.
26. J. Mill, Utilitarianism, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 365, 371, 373 (C.
Morris ed. 1959).
27. THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 22, at 13.
28. Id at 13-14.
29. See THE MORAL DECISION 61-71 (self preservation); id at 88-93 (sexual relations); J. Mill, Utilitarianism,in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS, supra note 26,
at 365, 374.
30. See J. Mill, On Liberty, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS, supra note 26, at
380-96. In essays memorializing him and recognizing his devotion to the Bill of
Rights, Professor Calm is characterized as a champion of civil liberties. McKay,
The Constitution and Edmond Cahn, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 233, 242 (1965); Redlich,
Edmond Cahn.-A Philosopherfor Democratic Man, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 250, 261
(1965). Professor Calm wrote to Justice Black, "We've disagreed, just barely
enough to prove that there are two of us," Black, About Edmond Cahn, 40 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 207, 207 (1964), and Justice Black wrote of him:
[H]is conversations, which I venture to say lifted us both above the commonplace things and to a greater appreciation of our country and its
Constitution, with its promise of freedom for the mind and spirit of man
to seek new light-always freedom to think and speak and write and
believe.
Id at 208.
31.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES

AND PROSTITUTION,

247 (1957). The Wolfenden Report, published in Great Britain, recommended that homosexual behavior between consenting adults in private should
not be subject to penal sanctions. For a discussion of the Wolfenden Report, see
G. PATON, supra note 16, at 155-58. See also Director of Pub. Prosecution v.
Shaw, 1962 A.C. 220.
CMD.
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law should punish immorality as such,3 2 and Professor H.L.A. Hart of
Oxford University, who argued that it should not.3 3 Although he was
an intensely religious man, steeped in the traditions of his faith and
sensitive to the impact of moral values on human behavior, 34 Professor
Cahn would probably take issue with Lord Justice Devlin's views, and
would agree with the Wolfenden Report and Professor Hart. Professor
Cahn, however, would steer between the natural law tone of Lord Justice Devlin's views, and the positivist orientation of Professor Hart.
Professor Cahn would argue that the danger to be avoided is an arbitrarily imposed standard of what is moral or immoral,3 5 and that to
forestall that result, the legislative body adopting the moral standard
should reach a consensus through the unique process he develops for
making "the moral decision." Professor Cahn explains this process in
Part One of his book, wherein he describes what he means by the moral
decision.
Professor Cahn begins by focusing on "Morals as a Legal Order."36 He contends that each person must discern the content of the
moral decision for himself by a process of personal moral legislation.
The objective to be gained is "a disciplined conscious self or conscience,
who will speak within on behalf of the outer community and will enforce [the community's] moral standards."3 7 According to Professor
Cahn, the moral values and precepts that originate outside a person,
that are experienced by the individual and that inform his conscience,
are not socially established mores. Moreover, they do not provide immediate answers to specific moral questions.38 They can, however, help
in making the moral decision. 39 For example, these moral values and
precepts assist one "to project into and to care about other selves ...
[T]hey can summon the self to recognize all that is generically human
in the moral predicaments of other individuals."4 0
32. Lord Justice Devlin argued that traditional moral values were a part of the common law tradition, and that:
[S]ociety may use the law to preserve morality in the same way as it uses
it to safeguard anything else that is essential to its existence. If therefore
the first proposition is securely established with all its implications, society has a prima facie right to legislate against immorality as such.
P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 11 (1965).
33. Professor Hart, relying on Mill, gave a negative answer to the question, "Ought
immorality as such to be a crime?" H. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 4-6
(1963).
34. McKay, supra note 30, at 248. This reviewer's recollection is that Professor
Cahn's jurisprudence lectures were punctuated by religious references stated with
appreciation, conviction, and respect. See also Black, supra note 30, at 208. Biblical references abound in The MoralDecision. See, e.g., THE MORAL DECISION 36,
265-66, 290.
35. THE MORAL DECISION 21, 25, 89.
36. Id at 9-34.
37. Id. at 23 (emphasis in original).
38. Id. at 27.
39. Id
40. Id. This concept of projection of one's self into another's self is the key to Profes-
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Felt moral values pass through three stages before they become,
for the individual, the bases for moral decision.4 First, group valueswhich include more than just the prevailing mores-are impressed
upon the individual until, at the second stage, they become "an implement of self-police." 4 2 In the third stage, these values are reformulated
by the decision-maker to reflect his own experience and personality
and, as they are externalized in decision and action, they and the group
value system on which they impact are, in an ongoing process, inevitably changed.43
Professor Cahn moves from a discussion of the precepts upon
which the moral decision is based, to a consideration of the moral types
that act as role models, and that make concrete the impressions and
assessments that lead to the moral decision. 44 He identifies three of
these moral types as having influenced American values: the "muscular" type, exemplified by the high principled activist; the "eupeptic"
type, who is more cheerful and opportunistic; and, the "well-adjusted
individual," who, like a chameleon, is ready to blend into his environment by conforming to the prevailing mores.4 5 Occasionally, a fourth
type will appear, exemplified by the "prophet," who, if he is not a false
prophet, advances "the moral constitution" by his protests against
injustice.4 6
Professor Calm concludes his treatment of "Morals as a Legal Order" with admonitions against too many ill-conceived "thou shalt
nots,"'47 and against attempts to impose negative or proscriptive
precepts on thought processes. 8 He then turns his attention to "Law as
sor Cahn's notion of empathy that figured prominently in his first major work, The
Sense of Injustice. There, he described the "sense of injustice" as follows:
Finally, the sense of injustice is no mere generic label for the concepts
already reviewed. It denotes that sympathetic reaction to outrage, horror, shock, resentment and anger, those affections of the viscera and abnormal secretions of the adrenals that prepare the human animal to
resist attack. Nature has thus equipped all men to regard injustice to
another as personal aggression. Through a mysterious and magical empathy or imaginative interchange, each projects himself into the shoes of
the other, not in pity or compassion merely, but in the vigor of selfdefense. Injustice is transmuted into assault; the sense of injustice is the
implement by which assault is discerned and defense is prepared.
THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 22, at 24 (emphasis in original).
41. THE MORAL DECISION 24.
42. Id at 24-25.
43. Id. at 25.
44. Id at 28.
45. Id at 29-30.
46. Id at 30.
47. Id. at 32-34.
48. He observes: "The most unsuccessful of the Ten Commandments is the tenth
('Thou shalt not covet'). ... Id at 34. The medieval English judges knew this:
"The thought of man shall not be tried, for the devil himself knoweth not the
thought of man-Brian, C.J., in Y.B. 7 Edward IV, Pasch. no. 2, f. 2 (1467)." T.
PLUCKNETT,

A

CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW

447 n.5 (5th ed. 1956).
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a Moral Order"4 9 and begins discussion50 of this topic by examining
"American Attitudes Towards the Law."
The history of American law, as Professor Cahn notes, reflects an
unresolved tension between those who have "an uncritical and excessive trust in what can be accomplished through legislation and policing" 5 1-a legalistic attitude, and those who have a mistrust of law and
government-an anti-legalistic attitude. 52 He warns against two variations of the legalistic attitude. First, there is positivism that "posits" or
"lays down" official commands and disclaims any interest in speculating about what the law ought to be. Proponents of the second variation, instead of distinguishing between law and morals, insist that they
are but the same. According to Professor Cahn, these excessive viewpoints distort both law and morals by denying that morals are relevant
to law, and by forgetting that some laws are morally neutral.53
The next topic is "Popular Distinctions Between Law and
Morals."54 Professor Cahn notes the relevance of not one, but three,
moral standards that impact on the law: the one we require, the one we
desire, and the one we revere.5 5 The latter standard has an element of
the heroic in its makeup that can make individuals who follow its
precepts difficult companions.5 6 There are fluctuating shifts in the emphasis these standards are given caused by extraneous factors such as
war and economic and racial unrest.57 Thus, in times of great ideological stress, measures repressive of human rights may be tolerated that
would be roundly condemned in a more tranquil period.5"
Professor Calm also disposes of the popular misconception that
law is concerned with externals, while morals look to the inner man, by
noting instances in which the law takes note of subjective mental
states. 59 He then criticizes another distinction sometimes made be49.

THE MORAL DECISION 35-38.
Id
Id at 35.
Id
Id at 37-38.
Id at 38-46.
Id at 40-41.
Id at 41.
Id.
Id An example of this phenomenon is the internment during World War II of
individuals, nearly all of Japanese origin, without regard to their loyalty to the
United States. See Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (construing Act of Mar.
21, 1942, ch. 191, 56 Stat. 173 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 97a (Supp. 11 1943) (repealed 1976); Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942)); Yasui v. United
States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) (same); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81
(1943) (same); see also S. 2116, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 1520, 98th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 4110, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 3387, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) (legislation seeking redress for these governmental excesses).
59. THE MORAL DECISION 45. That there are legal norms, such as traffic laws, the
moral content of which is neutral or more limited, does not contradict this contention. The law is very much concerned with states of mind, and motives are often

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

19841

The Moral Decision

419

tween law and morals that holds that "the only practicald!fference between them is in the respective methods by which they are enforced "60
He agrees that this pragmatic position has merit, but feels it is too limited in that it "intimates nothing concerning the really indispensable
clews, i.e., clews that might tell us what to look for when we see a familiar moral precept being enforced in the courts as a rule of law."6 1
He suggests that a decision-maker should observe how law as a social
institution "impresses its own distinctive characteristics on the moral
precepts it enforces." 6 The drama of the courtroom leaves its imprint,63 as does the craft of the lawyer-his affection for the "nice distinction" and other aspects of his professional discipline.' 4 Likewise
important in this context is the imprint of the social function of the
law,65 and the control exercised by the judge.66
Following his discussion of "Law as a Moral Order," Professor
Cahn devotes the second and major part of his book to a consideration
of "Moral Guides in the American Law of Rights."6 7 He presents this
subject by means of illuminating and entertaining critiques of actual
cases6 8 illustrative of the impact of moral values on various areas of the
law. His themes are aptly chosen, and the cases he selects to make his
points are particularly enlightening.
He begins by considering "The First of Life," 6 9 and under this
heading comments on "The Value of Being Alive,"7 "The Right to be
Young,"'" and "The Family as Moral Administration."72 The case
chosen to introduce this latter topic, White v. Thomson,7 3 involved an
action for alienation of affections. White reflects the law's "hands-off'
policy where family harmony is concerned. The White court held that,
as a matter of law, children could not enjoin their father and his paramour from consorting together.74
To explain the topic "The Value of Being Alive," Professor Calm

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

inferred from overt acts, e.g., mens rea in criminal law, intent in the law of decedents' estates. Id
Id at 47 (emphasis in original).
Id at 48.
Id at 49.
Id at 49-50.
Id at 53.
Id at 54-55.
Id at 55-56.
Id at 59-248.
Professor Cahn identified some of these cases only by the first letter of the last
name of each party, by the year in which the case was decided, and by the volume
and page number of the law report series in which the case may be located. In
some instances he omitted the identity of the jurisdiction that decided the case.
THE MORAL DECISION 61-87.
Id at 61-71.
Id at 72-77.
Id at 77-87.
324 Mass. 140, 85 N.E.2d 246 (1949).
Id at 143, 85 N.E.2d at 247; THE MORAL DECISION 77.
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discusses United States v. Holmes.7 5 In this famous case, a seaman was
convicted of manslaughter for throwing male passengers overboard to
prevent the sinking of a "long boat" in which some of the crew of a
sinking ship and its passengers had taken refuge. This decision illustrates the proposition that whereas self-defense is a valid defense to
homicide, duress and necessity are not.7 6 Professor Cahn skillfully
leads the reader to conclude that if there are no heroic martyrs to sacrifice themselves in favor of the rest, all must await death or rescue. All
are congeners literally "in the same boat," and no one can save himself
by killing another. There can be no casting of lots, for the stakes are
too high for gambling, and no one can escape the taint of the throw of
the dice.77
In his discussion of "Sexual Relationships,"7 8 the second topic in
Part Two, Professor Calm anticipates the delineation of the right of
privacy established by Griswold v. Connecticut. " The case selected to
introduce the subtopic "Love's Right of Privacy,"8 ° Rachel v. State,"'
involved the reversal of the convictions of a white woman and a black
man for "openly outraging public decency and injuring public morals"
by engaging in sexual intercourse.8 2 Professor Calm, ahead of his time
75. 26 F. Cas. 360 (E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 15,383).
76. Id.; Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12 So. 301 (1893); Regina v. Dudley, 14 Q.B.D. 273
(1884). The celebrated "Problem of the Sinking Plank," which in its various versions has been a favorite of jurists for centuries, presents the same issue. See G.
CHRISTIE, supra note 13, at 200 & n.164 (briefly noting divergent opinions of
Francis Bacon, Hugo Grotius, Samuel von Pufendorf, and Immanuel Kant on this
problem); see also Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV.
616 (1949) (raising the same moral and legal issues). The sinking plank problem
appears in a syllabus prepared in 1957 by Professors Hardy C. Dillard and Marcus B. Mallet of the University of Virginia for use by students in a legal philosophy seminar. In their version of the problem, students are asked to decide to
whom of the struggling survivors seeking support from a plank should a life preserver be thrown. Only one can be saved by the life preserver, and the candidates
for rescue personify differing degrees of virtue and value to society.
77. THE MORAL DECISION 71. As a postscript to this justification for the objective
moral worth of every person, Professor Cahn analogizes earth to the lifeboat in
the Holmes case. Id He wrote before the nuclear arms race intensified and
before concern for the environment became critical, but the metaphor is apt.
78. THE MORAL DECISION 88-122.
79. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Griswold spawned a host of decisions based on the right of
privacy. Eg., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (freedom to marry);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (family living arrangements); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (child custody).
80. THE MORAL DECISION 88-93.
81. 71 Okla. Crim. 33, 107 P.2d 813 (1940).
82. THE MORAL DECISION 88. The intended sexual partners were unmarried, and
their conduct was occurring in private when the police, having observed them in
the darkened room by flashlight, burst into the bedroom and interrupted them.
The court held that even if fornication had been a crime in Oklahoma, which it
was not, whatever sexual conduct had occurred had taken place in private and
was not forbidden by statute. Id at 88-89.
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in recognizing the momentum of the sexual revolution, 3 leads the
reader to the heart of the problem presented by the Rachel case: what
nexus should exist between law and morals with respect to sexual love?
There is much misunderstanding about the morality of sex, and even
more uncertainty concerning what sexual conduct the law should
reach. 4 Professor Cahn argues that private sexual behavior, which is
not intrinsically evil, as is rape8 5 or injury to a child,86 should not be a
concern of the criminal law, nor can it be effectively repressed by that
law. Nevertheless, Professor Cahn suggests that despite the law's uncertainty and lack of uniformity on this question, "we should still have
to ask ourselves whether [private fornication] is morally permissible." 8 7
On another aspect of sexual relationships, the "Grounds for Divorce,"8 8 Professor Cahn drew upon his wide knowledge of Roman and
Canon law to examine and reject the doctrine of recrimination as a
defense to an action for divorce. In his consideration of Pavletich v.
Pavletich,89 the case chosen to illustrate this topic, Professor Cahn anticipates the current trend towards no-fault divorce.9" He notes that if
the parties can never be reconciled, that one party is more guilty of
marital misconduct than the other should not bar a divorce petition at
the instance of the more guilty party. It seems, he argues, a perverse
sort of logic to use the doctrine of recrimination to force couples who
ought to be separated to remain joined.9 Professor Cahn reviews the
grounds for severing the marriage bond and discusses whether the parties should be free to try again. At least in law they are free, and Professor Cahn indicates that "[w]e are a nation of congenital optimists" in
our belief that next time it will be better.9 2
Professor Cahn highlights several other areas of the law in which
morality plays a major role, such as the duty of honesty in the market
place,9 3 malicious interference with a business enterprise,9" and the fiduciary duty of loyalty of a person associated with another in a joint
business venture.95 In another section entitled "Business with Govern83. Id. at 92-93.
84. Id. at 89-92.
85. Id. at 89. The distinction based on the privacy of the act would be untenable if
the prevailing mores signified that the act was evil in itself. Id at 92.
86. Id. at 89.
87. Id. at 90.
88. Id at 110-22.
89. 50 N.M. 224, 174 P.2d 826 (1946).
90. THE MORAL DECISION 121. Professor Cahn notes that "[tihere never was a husband or wife altogether fit, in the forum of conscience, to throw the first stone."
Id Roman law was surprisingly modern in recognizing the concept of no-fault
divorce. For a brief account of divorce in Roman law, see R. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 67-68 (4th ed. 1956).
91. THE MORAL DECISION 121.
92. Id
93. Id at 123-35.
94. Id. at 135-47.
95. Id.at 147-53.
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ment," Professor Cahn also examines the demands of ethics in one's
dealings with the government. 96 The topics discussed under this heading include such varied subjects as the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants,9 7 cheating on taxes," and what is expected of a person
as a consequence of his citizenship.9 9
Professor Cahn introduces this latter topic, "The Citizen's Allegiance,"0 by an explanation of Marsh v. Alabama' °" and Tucker v.
Texas, 102 two celebrated cases on the freedoms of speech and religion. 10 3 In Marsh, the Court reversed the trespass conviction of a
member of the Jehovah's Witness sect who had persisted in displaying
her religious literature while standing on the sidewalk of a company
town in Alabama." ° In Tucker, the Court likewise reversed the conviction of a member of the same sect for the door-to-door distribution
of religious literature in a government-owned village, contrary to a
Texas statute. 10 5
It may appear at first blush that freedom of speech as conceived by
Justice Black in Marsh and Tucker bears no relationship to good citizenship. Professor Cahn, however, believed that Justice Black recognized a fundamental nexus between the two. Responsible participation
by the citizen in the affairs of government is the hallmark of a democratic society, and a citizen cannot make effective decisions unless he is
informed. The channels of communication and access to information
must be kept open. Thus, while the Constitution generally protects the
right of the communicator, in this instance it is the constitutional protection of the right of the citizen to receive information that is decisive. ' 6 Correspondingly, it is the duty of the citizen to act responsibly
on the basis of the information at his disposal. He is to challenge the
majority if he thinks it is wrong, and should persist in his dissent even
96. Id at 154-82.
97. Id. at 161-62 (discussing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
98. Id at 164-75.
99. Id at 175-82.
100. Id
101. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
102. 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
103. THE MORAL DECISION 175-76. Justice Black's reasoning in these cases was, in
Professor Cahn's view, "incandescent." Id at 176. My notes from Professor
Cahn's Jurisprudence course for October 11, 1948, make particularly vivid my
recollection of Professor Cahn's enthusiastic and illuminating discussion of these
cases in class, and demonstrate the influence of Justice Black upon his thinking.
Professor Calm stated: "Black detests natural law as he understands it. Yet he
uses it here." Professor Calm attributed Justice Black's rationale to Aristotle, who
identified the power of speech as that which sets man apart from other creatures.
This faculty leads to man's ability to distinguish right from wrong, and to the
enhancement of man's life in political society.
104. THE MORAL DECISION 175-76.
105. Id
106. Id at 176-77.
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at the risk of adverse consequences if so instructed by his conscience. 107
Such is the teaching of two cases on loyalty °8 that Professor Cahn discusses in concluding "The Citizen's Allegiance."' 9
The final two topics discussed under the heading "Moral Guides
in the American Law of Rights" are "The Enlargement of Personality" 0 and "The Last of Life."'I Professor Cahn's treatment of these
topics is a further testimonial to his skill as a story teller, the breadth of
his learning, and the precision of his insights. His thesis with respect to
the topic, "The Enlargement of Personality," is that one's personality is
enlarged by acts of magnaminity such as that in Wagner v. International
Railway Co. 12 In that case, a train passenger sued the railway for injuries sustained when he fell from a trestle. Despite the possibility of risk
to himself, the passenger had ventured onto the trestle to rescue his
cousin who had fallen from the train.'
The passenger lost at the trial
level, but he prevailed in the Court of Appeals of New York. There,
Chief Judge Cardozo, speaking for a unanimous court, pronounced his
now famous rationale: "Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the
summons to relief.""' 4 In Professor Cahn's view, the Wagner case
moves the law towards a higher moral plane. The nineteenth century
values of laissez-faire and individualism fostered enterprise and initiative, but they also favored an attitude of callous indifference towards
victims in need of rescue. Wagner suggests that the moral value to inform the law in duty to rescue cases is magnaminity, not individual
self-interest. 115
In exploring the duty to rescue, Professor Calm informs the reader
through a consideration of the parable of the Good Samaritan, 116 and
extrapolates hypotheticals from the parable by subtle changes in its
facts.li 7 From the Bible, Professor Calm moves to literature" 18 to illus107. Id at 179-80.
108. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In Girouard,the Court held that a pacifist's "allegiance to the cosmic value of human life is not incompatible with assuming allegiance to the United States." THE MORAL DECISION 181 (quoting Girouard,328
U.S. at 70). In Barnette, the Court held that a school board could not require
children of Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag if they believed it was an idolotrous image. THE MORAL DECISION 181 (discussing Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
109. THE MORAL DECISION 181.
110. Id at 183-214.
111. Id at 215-48.
112. 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
113. THE MORAL DECISION 183.
114. Id at 184, 194 (quoting Wagner, 232 N.Y. at 180, 133 N.E. at 437).
115. THE MORAL DECISION 190, 194-95.
116. Id at 185, 195.
117. Id. at 185-86.
118. Id at 186. Professor Cahn brings into focus celebrated characters such as Miguel
de Cervantes' Don Quixote, Feodor Dostoevski's Raskolnikov, and Henry Fielding's Joseph Andrews. Id at 186-90.
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trate how the law sometimes discourages acts of magnaminity," 9 and
yet at other times may seem to prompt generous gestures. 120 He further
suggests that the trend in American decisional law is away from laissez2
faire individualism toward a legal recognition of the duty to rescue.' '
In his final chapter on the theme of "Moral Guides in the American Law of Rights," Professor Cahn analyzes the topic "The Last of
Life."' 2 2 Under this heading, he discusses issues ranging from physical
disability 123 to suicide and other aspects of death. 124 His view that suicide is justifiable only if there is no other way to save one's inner self is
a striking example of the respect Professor Cahn has for the autonomy
of the individual. Personal freedom and responsibility are to him ultimate moral values. A purely naturalistic conception of freedom, however, may be a deceptive benchmark for the justification of suicide.
Each human being may have personal autonomy and responsibility
within the perimeters of his being, and self-destruction may be the ultimate demonstration of that autonomy at least in human terms; but no
individual is the source or author of his being and therefore no person
can claim the moral title to will his non-being or be the direct engine of
that result.
Professor Cahn concludes his discussion of "The Last of Life"
with some "Interim Comments," 125 in which he reminds the reader that
he did not intend in his discussion of "Moral Guides in the American
Law of Rights" to discover a formula or a system for discerning the
good in law. Rather, he tried to select cases that would serve as prisms
119. Id at 186.
120. Id at 190. For example, Professor Cahn remarks: "[Alt least when any Joseph
pictures himself shivering and bleeding beside the road, he will heartily commend
the law as one of the episode's implicit heros. And he may be disposed to infer
that in certain important respects the fear of the law is the beginning of virtue."
Id
121. Id For a discussion of the duty to rescue, see generally Note, The Failure to
Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 631 (1952).
122. THE MORAL DECISION 215-48.
123. Id at 215-21. Professor Cahn discusses Smith v. Sneller, 345 Pa. 68, 26 A.2d 452
(1942), in which the court denied recovery to a nearly blind plaintiff because his
negligence in failing to use a cane contributed to his injury.
124. THE MORAL DECISION 222-43. Professor Cahn begins his discussion of death
with an examination of Chamberlain v. Feldman, 300 N.Y. 135, 89 N.E. 2d 863
(1949). The Chamberlain court held that Mark Twain's estate and his survivors
could prevent publication of a manuscript that the author had not intended for
publication. Professor Cahn suggests using the rule against perpetuities as a guide
in determining how long publication may be enjoined after the death of the author. THE MORAL DECISION 230-31. He concludes the topic with some observations on suicide, and suggests that suicide, as a form of homicide, can be justified
only on the theory of self-defense to "preserve the generic integrity of the individual though at the cost of ending his private capacities and of destroying whatever
within him is unique and ongoing." Id at 239-40. With characteristic sensitivity
and compassion, Professor Cahn advises against passing judgment on suicide,
"for until a man has crawled his way through that same valley, he can understand
nothing of its unique and solitary terrain.
Id at 240.
125. THE MORAL DECISION 244-48.
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to "catch the undifferentiated, white light of the good and disperse it in
multiple colors and rays-precise, decisive and responsible."' 2 6 He
further notes that his findings have continually emphasized the moral
freedom of the individual human being.' 2 7 These "Interim Comments" serve as a summary of his discourse thus far and lead into Part
Three of The Moral Decision, "Moral Guides in the American Law of
Procedure." 2 8
Part Three, which to this reviewer is the most rewarding portion of
the book, is subdivided into two segments, each of which examines a
different aspect of the impact of morals on procedural norms. In the
first of these segments, "The Forum,"' 2 9 Professor Cahn introduces by
way of metaphors reminiscent of Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and other preSocratic Greek philosophers, 3 0 a discussion of his concept of the "due
process of moral decision." With the exception of the advice of counsel, 13 1 all of the legal criteria for due process-no ex post facto laws,
notice and opportunity to be heard, unbiased and attentive triers of the
law and fact, and remedial processes to correct error132-apply to the
"formation of defensible judgments in the life of morals."'' 33 This
means, Professor Calm argues, that the moral decision-maker must
have a special attitude of mind that strives zealously for truth if he 3is
properly to apply due process considerations to the moral decision. 1
To explain this attitude of mind, Professor Calm draws again upon the
wisdom of Judge
Jerome Frank, and borrows his concept of "fact' 35
skepticism."'
Judge Frank's fact-skepticism, Professor Calm observes, is a hesitancy to accept blindly assertions of fact that may lack cogency because
of a number of "traps and snares"' 36 in the fact finding process, such as
weaknesses in a witness's powers of observation, memory, and narration, as well as similar shortcomings on the part of the triers of fact and
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id at 245.
Id at 247.
Id at 249-315.
Id. at 251-60.
Id at 252;
Eg., "Wisdom is neither dry nor cold but moist and warm.
"These adversaries can be labeled in the same way the early Greeks labeled the
constituent elements of the physical universe: the adversaries of earth, air, fire and
water." Id at 255. Heraclitus made similar comments. See J. ROBINSON, AN
INTRODUCTION TO EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY 87-105 (1968). For a discussion of
the pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, see generally 1 F. COPLESTON, A HISTORY
OF PHILOSOPHY 13-80 (1947); R. WARNER, THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS 9-48
(1959). Professor Calm also metaphorically offers the reader a key to moral insights. THE MORAL DECISION 252 ("The key I present is 'due process of moral
decision.' ")
THE MORAL DECISION 254.
Id at 253.
Id at 254.
See id at 256.
Id at 257.
Id
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law.' 37 For Professor Cahn, the criteria for the due process of the
moral decision' 3 8 are but applications to morals of Judge Frank's factskepticism critiques. 39
In the context of the topics "The Freedom to Decide" 4 ° and "The
Skills of Compromise, '' 4 1 Professor Cahn employs two celebrated
cases to demonstrate the application of fact-skepticism to the "Due
Process of Moral Decision." The first is Bushell's Case. 142 One cannot
but admire the heroic jurors in this case who steadfastly refused to convict William Penn and William Mead on charges of unlawful assembly,
despite pressure from the court to do so, and who were illegally imprisoned for their courage. Bushell and the other jurors were finally vindicated, and Professor Cahn notes that "Bushell's Case has erected due
process in Anglo-American procedure on a firm and enduring foundation of fact-skepticism."' 4 3 Sincerity of conviction on the part of the
authorities is not a substitute for procedural fairness in the discovery of
the defendant's guilt or innocence.'"
Brown v. Board of Education,"' the famous school desegregation
case, provides Professor Cahn with a vehicle to demonstrate how duration can be another moral dimension, for the limits of which fact-skep46
ticism provides guidance by counseling caution and circumspection. 1
One may, for example, have a valid claim, but the time may not be ripe
to assert it in all its fullness. Thus, it is necessary to strike a balance
between an illegally deprived right and its immediate vindication, between the "void" and the "valid."' 4 7 These observations are explained
more fully by Professor Cahn in his discussion of compromise and negotiation 4 8 as manifestations of fact-skepticism. Thus, in Brown the
time had come to discard the doctrine of separate but equal facilities
for whites and non-whites as the standard of equal protection under the
Constitution. The instantaneous reversal of attitudes and patterns of
behavior that had existed for decades, in response to idealistic demands
for immediate school integration, however, would be disruptive and
counter-productive. Consequently, the Court was hesitant to vindicate
the plaintiffs' claims immediately, and instead ordered "an effective
137. Id at 257-58.
138. Id at 253.
139. See id. at 259 ("Turning back to the sphere of morals, we shall find that 'factskepticism' will mark and influence our views in almost every remaining portion
of this book.").
140. Id at 260-72,
141. Id at 272-85.
142. 6 How. St. Tr. 999, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (1670).
143. THE MORAL DECISION 262.
144. Id.
145. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
146. THE MORAL DECISION 276-78.

147. Id. at 276-77.
148. Id at 272-85.
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gradual adjustment,"'' 4 9 a compromise, the details of which were to be
worked out among the parties by negotiation. This achieved the ends
that justice demanded, while minimizing any adverse social impact.
In the final segment on the subject of "Moral Guides in the American Law of Procedure," Professor Cahn examines a topic entitled "In
the Mind of the Judge,"' 5 ° which in turn is divided into three subtopics:
"Inference and Evidence," '51 "Whose Decision?,"' 2 and "The Cosmic
Meaning of Decision."'' 53 Under the heading "Inference and Evidence," Professor Cahn suggests that some ethical insights may help to
explain the technical obscurities that surround the rules concerning
presumptions and burdens of proof. He compares a statutory presumption, such as the presumption of fraud from proof of a bank's insolvency, 5 4 to a "crutch" that judges may refuse to use on the ground that
"they can find no rational connection between fact A, which is duly
proved by proper evidence, and fact B, which they are asked to infer
from it. . . .,
Thus, they will hold the statutory presumption to be
unconstitutional on due process grounds. 156 The moral goals suggested
by Professor Cahn in this context are a willingness to uncover the facts
and to "put away the crutch of irrational inference and the complementary crutch of vulgar prejudice that indolent minds love to lean
upon." 157
The fact-skepticism approach has a singular role to play with respect to two rules that Professor Cahn next considers: the burden of
proof and the presumption of innocence that apply in criminal cases. 158
Professor Cahn's treatment of these rules is clear but somewhat cursory. He notes that in the popular mind these rules are regarded as
equivalent, 159 but he does not delve more deeply into this popular mis149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id at 274.
Id at 286-315.
Id. at 286-300.
Id at 300-12.
Id.at 312-15.
For a discussion of Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1929) and Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219 (1911), upon which the Manley Court relied, see THE MORAL DECISION 286-88. The Court in Bailey invalidated as unconstitutional a statutory presumption of fraud from the failure of an employee to repay a loan to his
employer. Id at 288.

155. THE MORAL DECISION 289.
156. See id at 287, 289.

157. Id. at 290.
158. Id. at 291-97.
159. Id at 291. The distinctions between the two rules became blurred following Professor James Thayer's attack on Justice White's opinion in Coffin v. United States,
156 U.S. 432 (1895), in which Justice White held that the presumption of innocence was "evidence." Id at 460. Professor Thayer ably demonstrated that the
presumption is a rule about evidence, but it is not, and cannot be, "evidence," i.e.,
tangible probative matter. Rather, in Professor Thayer's view, the presumption of
innocence is the other side of the burden of proof coin, and a caution to the triers

of fact not to draw inferences of guilt from matters not in evidence, such as the
presence of the defendant in the dock. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
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conception and does not identify the legal distinctions between the
rules. He thus loses an opportunity to emphasize the unique support
the rule that "the accused is presumed to be innocent" gives to factskepticism theory. The rule regarding the burden of proof is two-pronged. In imposing the burden of proof on the prosecution, the rule
addresses itself to the adversaries in the trial drama, but in mandating
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the rule points to the triers of fact
and directs their fact-believing processes. It requires them to doubt
guilt if they can believe innocence. By contrast, the rule requiring the
accused to be presumed innocent aims solely at the triers of fact, directing theirfact-inferring processes. It mandates an attitude of constant ambivalence toward contentions of fact that point to guilt and
instructs the fact finders that even when they believe the evidence in
support of the prosecution's case, they should not infer guilt therefrom
if an inference of innocence is equally tenable. In fulfilling this role,
the presumption of innocence is the epitome of fact-skepticism.
Professor Cahn's discussion of the moral bases for these rules is,
however, illuminating. He posits three possible moral bases for these
rules,' 60 the first of which is religious. As in the example of the biblical
admonition against judging lest one be judged,' 6 I one applies the rules
concerning burden of proof and presumption of innocence to another's
case, hoping he would be accorded their benefit were he tried. 62 Second, a socially oriented moral attitude would call for the application of
these rules in a given case because of an underlying postulate that society is partly to blame for the accused's predicament.' 63 The third
moral basis for these rules, which he attributes to Aristotle, is the one
that Professor Cahn prefers. This is the point of view of the "equitable
man."' 164 It combines the other two bases, and asserts that
"[c]onfronted by the universal and eternal ocean of anguish that flows
wherever there are men, [the equitable man] will not add a single drop
to its tide unless justice, having removed the last vestige of a reasonable
doubt, compels him." 165 If, therefore, the decision-maker would truly
wish his actions to be in accord with due process, he must be guided by

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW app. B, at 562-64 (1898); see 9 J.WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 2497, 2511 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). Recently, the Court has reemphasized the singular role of the presumption of innocence. See Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979); Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978). For a
more detailed analysis of the presumption of innocence, see Reough, Presumptions
and the Burden of Proof, 26 ILL. L. REV. 703 (1942); Cunningham, The Presumption of Innocence: A Comparative Study (1957) (unpublished thesis, The Judge
Advocate General's School, Charlottesville,Va.).
THE MORAL DECISION 297-99.
Id. at 297-98. Professor Cahn more directly refers to this biblical admonition in
support of his analysis of distinctions between the burdens of proof in civil and
criminal cases, and of the demands of due process. Id at 265-66.
Id. at 297-98.
Id. at 298.
Id at 298-99.
Id. at 299.
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the conscience of a temperate and upright man"' and, imbued with an
attitude of fact-skepticism, address his deliberations and actions respecting "the moral decision" accordingly.
Under the subtopic, "Whose Decision?," 16' 7 Professor Cahn
presents his last illustrative case, Repoulle v. United States. 168 In this
tragic and perplexing case, Repouille's petition for naturalization was
denied on appeal because less than five years before filing his petition
he had been convicted of manslaughter. The homicide was a mercy
killing in which Repouille had used chloroform to kill his blind, mute,
deformed, and retarded son. In light of this prior conviction, the court
denied Repouille's naturalization petition, finding he was not a person
of "good moral character."' 169 Professor Cahn criticizes the method of
determining good moral character used by Judge Learned Hand in Repouile. Judge Hand, writing for the majority of the court of appeals,
insisted that moral right and wrong must be determined by the prevailing common conscience of the community. 7 ° Judge Frank noted in
dissent that if community opinion were to be decisive, the presiding
judge should be required to take additional evidence on community
mores, and to ask ethical leaders for their views. 7 ' Professor Cahn, in
approval of Judge Frank's analysis, found support in the view of Professor John Chipman Gray that a judge should follow his own notions
of right and wrong. When faced with diverse positions on an issue, a
judge should make a moral commitment and select a point of view he
can adopt as his own.' 7 2 Thus, a judge must be not only fair-minded
166. Id ; see supra note 13.
167.

THE MORAL DECISION

300-12.

168. 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947).
169.

THE MORAL DECISION

300-01.

170. Id. at 301.
171. Id at 304.
172. Id. at 302. Professor Cahn had cited Professor Gray to the same effect in THE
SENSE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 22, at 114 n.52. Professor Cahn very likely had
an additional source for the view he shared with Professor Gray. Lucas de Penna
(1320-1390) expressed concern over the difference between the public and the private conscience of the judge. In giving priority to his private conscience, Lucas
argued, contrary to St. Thomas Aquinas, that if a judge had personal knowledge
of the innocence of the defendant brought before him, he should acquit him even
though the evidence presented in court satisfied the prescribed quantum of proof
of guilt. W. ULLMANN, THE MEDIEVAL IDEA OF LAW 126-29 (1946). Professor
Cahn cited Lucas in THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE, supra note 22, at 108, 110, and also
alluded favorably to him in the first meeting of his Jurisprudence class on September 27, 1948. In that class, he described Lucas as a link in a long chain of natural
law thinkers who had rejected the notion that the Church, as the depository of
divine law, was the ultimate arbitrator of natural law. Lucas thus secularized
natural law, contending that divine law and natural law were identical, and that a
lay person could understand natural law without ecclesiastical guidance. The
challenge this revolutionary idea presented to the authorities of Lucas's time was
obvious. My notes further report:
[L]ike a cancer from within [Lucas's] theses started the breakdown of the
system. They mark a turning point in medieval thinking. His break
with Aquinas and the other scholastic thinkers on the province of natu-
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17 3
and circumspect, he must also be a reflective and responsible judge.
In his concluding segment of Part Three, "In the Mind of the
Judge," Professor Cahn discusses "The Cosmic Meaning of Decision."' 7 4 Here, he is optimistic, but not blindly or naively so. Basing
his observations on human experience, he believes it is possible for
mankind to achieve a better moral world. In his view, the human species is fickle and unstable, but not predominantly evil. The prophets of
old reached a lofty moral plane, which contemporary and future man
can surpass. 17 5 Professor Cahn notes that "[e]verything we have
learned from the ancients needs to be refined through modem experi' 76
ence and employed toward producing still better moral decisions."'
Professor Cahn places very little faith in the contribution that quantitative science and technology can make to this endeavor, for "[in morals,
there is no basis for saying that ten good decisions are worth ten times
as much as one."' 1 77 The test of moral value "will always be qualitative."' 78 For Professor Calm, the answer to moral progress is to be
found in the dynamic good of the moral choice, for by "merely seeking
to ascertain what is righteous we can bring the quality into existence,
where it persists until we learn, as we may, to form still more humane
decisions."' 179 Thus, Professor Cahn is optimistic about the future of
the human condition, provided that the judge, and indeed all decisionmakers, "accept the yoke of due process and personal responsibility"' °
and strive to move ever forward the quality of the moral decision.
It is clear from the foregoing that Professor Calm is a profound,
original thinker. His insights are penetrating and incisive and they extend over many intellectual disciplines. He is equally at home in religion, ethics, philosophy, and literature as he is in the law, and he
expects his readers to have a modicum of understanding of the cultural
values that have molded the character of contemporary civilized man.
He requires attentive reading, for if his words are but lightly scanned,
many of the subtle nuances of his ideas and the graceful manner in
which he conveys them will escape the reader's notice. He needs to be
relished and savored; many passages should be read and reread to appreciate more fully the benefit of his message.
For these reasons, a conclusion in the form of a condensation or
summation of Professor Cahm's views would tend to be crabbed and
distorted. Rather than attempt such a truncated summary, this re-
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viewer will reiterate what he conceives to be the principal tenets of Professor Cahn's thesis, and to assess his position as a jurist in light of the
themes he develops and the various influences on his thinking.
The moral decision is a personal decision. Professor Cahn asks the
reader to use the cases he describes as vehicles for personal analysis
and reflection. Each individual must discover the moral content of the
decision for himself. The moral decision concerns not only officials, for
every person has an obligation as a human being to premise his decisions and actions on a moral foundation.
The law, as Professor Cahn eloquently demonstrates throughout
his book, is a potent source of insight for moral decisions. But the decision-maker ought not passively accept legal rubrics as definitive ethical
pronouncements. Neither should he assent without reflection to moral
pronouncements purportedly bearing a divine imprimatur. At the
other extreme are value judgments reflecting conventional mores.
These too, the decision-maker should carefully weigh, lest the tenor of
his convictions be distorted and diluted by pious platitudes or vague
sentimental formulations.
The moral decision should be bottomed on the firmer foundation
of open-mindedness and persistent inquiry. It should reflect reason
and courage and evoke human responses ranging from magnanimity to
righteous indignation. It must be a human decision stamped with
human values. It is this characteristic that gives the moral character of
the decision its universality. In seeking a premise for his moral insights, the decision-maker must reach for fundamental moral values
such as integrity, honor, righteousness, and rectitude.
For Professor Cahn, these fundamental values are the moral determinants of generically human behavior. They are norms that apply to
all mankind, but their relevance and efficacy do not depend on their
congruence with the cosmic order of things. Their validity is predicated on the human condition, or at least on man's assessment of that
condition. This humanistic perspective is anthropocentric, or man-centered. Given its premises, it is a defensible position, but a theocentric,
or God-centered, humanism would emphasize different moral values
and sometimes yield different results.181
181. As a major philosopher in the scholastic tradition has stated:
One sees immediately that the word humanism is ambiguous. It is clear
that whoever uses the word brings into play at once an entire metaphysic, and that the idea we form of humanism will have wholly different implications according to whether we hold or do not hold that there
is in the nature of man something which breathes an air outside of time
and a personality whose profoundest needs surpass the order of the
universe.
J. MARITAIN, TRUE HUMANISM xii (1941) (emphasis in original). Maritain went
on to note:
We are thus led to distinguish between two kinds of humanism: a humanism which is theocentric or truly christian; and one which is anthropocentric, for which the spirit of the Renaissance and that of the
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Professor Cahn is concerned with several aspects of morality, and
as noted above, he deals forthrightly with suicide,' 82 euthanasia, 1 83 sexual love,' 84 the ethics of the marketplace, 85 the moral duties of the
citizen and government officials, 86 and a variety of related topics. In
keeping with the seriousness of the subject there is not much humor in
the book. Professor Cahn's goal is to educate rather than to entertain.
But the book is by no means solemn or sermonizing, and there are
passages in which the author gives the reader subtle hints of his amusement at the human condition.' 8 7
As for categorizing Professor Cahn and endeavoring to position
him in the ranks of the jurists, his preeminence is assured. Assigning a
jurisprudential label to him, however, is difficult. He cannot be wholly
identified with any of the traditional schools of jurisprudence, although
he subscribes to some of the views of several jurists. He is, in short, his
own man, suigeneris, and if this inconclusive grouping results in a certain eclecticism, that may prove to be fortuitous. He did not set out to
discover a formula or system, 188 or to present a litany of norms that
would provide a ready-made solution to moral problems. Rather, he
was in pursuit of wisdom, and he was willing to reach for it wherever
he found it. That is why his book is a treasure house of subtle precepts
drawn from ancient Greece and Rome, the Judeo-Christian tradition,
and from medieval and modern jurists and moralists. His achievements are that he makes the reader aware of the attitude with which he
should face moral decisions, and of the process through which he
should go to transform values received from outside himself into the
commandments of conscience. The attitude to be desired is one of
open-minded hesitancy, of suspended judgment until all the determinants have been weighed. The process is one of distillation of values for
the purpose of self-enlightenment. The goal is moral rectitude, and the
movement of the law towards a higher moral plane.
Those who have influenced him and whose insights and character
he extols are those who have advanced moral legislation by their heroic
virtue and creative individuality. He admires prophets and martyrs,
Reformation were primarily responsible, of which we have just been
speaking. The first kind of humanism recognises that the centre for man
is God; it implies the christian conception of man as at once a sinner and
redeemed, and the christian conception of grace and freedom, whose
principles we have already called to mind. The second kind of humanism believes that man is his own centre, and therefore the centre of all
things. It implies a naturalistic conception of man and freedom.
Id at 19.
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and indeed asks for martyrs as a solution to the problem of the overloaded and foundering lifeboat in United States v. Holmes. '9 He also
respects thinkers of an independent turn of mind such as Lucas de
Penna,' 90 and Henry David Thoreau, 9 ' and men of courage such as
the jurors in Bushell's Case. 192 Among the jurists who have influenced
him, preeminence must be given to Judge Jerome Frank, 93 but one
should not overlook Baruch Spinoza, 94 John Stuart Mill, 95 Justice
198
97
Benjamin Cardozo, 96 Charles S. Pierce, and Justice Hugo Black.
Professor Cahn's message is one of optimism. In terms of eternity,
man's petty concerns are of no moment, but each age can create moral
standards superior to those of earlier times. Professor Calm believes
the process will continue, not to utopia, but to a happier world of justice, kindness, and compassion. In this journey, each individual must
face up to making his own moral decisions. Professor Cahn offers guidance towards that end. His insights are cogent and persuasive, and he
tells his tale with grace and perceptiveness. His message is as valuable
today as it was when The MoralDecision was first published, and it will
remain of value for generations yet to come.
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